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Abstract 
My study explores the effect of future volatility expectations, embedded in VIX index, on large daily 
stock price changes and on subsequent stock returns. Following both psychological and financial 
literature claiming that good (bad) mood may cause people to perceive positive (negative) future 
outcomes as more probable and that the changes in the value of VIX may be negatively correlated with 
contemporaneous investors’ mood, I hypothesize that if a major positive (negative) stock price move 
takes place on a day when the value of VIX falls (rises), then its magnitude may be amplified by 
positive (negative) investors’ mood, creating price overreaction to the initial company-specific shock, 
which may result in subsequent price reversal. In line with my hypothesis, I document that both positive 
and negative large price moves accompanied by the opposite-sign contemporaneous changes in VIX 
are followed by significant reversals on the next two trading days and over five- and twenty-day 
intervals following the event, the magnitude of the reversals increasing over longer post-event windows, 
while large stock price changes taking place on the days when the value of VIX moves in the same 
direction are followed by non-significant price drifts. The results remain robust after accounting for 
additional company (size, beta, historical volatility) and event-specific (stock’s return and trading 
volume on the event day) factors, and are stronger for small and volatile stocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Stock prices are affected by an enormous, and virtually indefinite, number of factors. Some of these 
factors may be clearly established, giving rise to a vast strand of literature dealing with the possibilities 
for price prediction, while others remain unobserved and may be revealed only in a broader perspective. 
In many instances, the stock price changes themselves are analyzed in attempt to predict future price 
patterns. 
This paper focuses on the behavior of stock prices after significant price moves. The latter can be 
driven by a number of factors, including new information about a firm’s prospects, liquidity shocks 
affecting current shareholders and shifts in demand by uninformed investors, and are considered to 
capture the magnitude of information signals. There is an extensive literature examining short-term 
stock return predictability following large price changes. A number of studies document subsequent 
reversals, and therefore, suggest that the initial changes contain some element of overreaction (e.g., 
Cooper, 1999; Sturm, 2003; Avramov et al., 2006). Others either do not detect reversals following 
major price changes (e.g., Ratner & Leal, 1998; Lasfer et al., 2003; Mazouz et al., 2009), or conclude 
that the reversals are too small to generate profitable arbitrage opportunities (e.g., Lehmann, 1990; 
Hamelink, 1999; Fehle & Zdorovtsov, 2003). Another group of studies concentrates on the link 
between the large stock price changes and the public information (e.g., Ikenberry & Ramnath, 2002; 
Larson & Madura, 2003; Vega, 2006; Savor, 2012). The general conclusions arising from this literature 
are that large price moves accompanied by public information releases are followed by drifts, 
indicating that investors tend to underreact to news about fundamentals, while those that are not 
accompanied by any public news result in reversals, suggesting that investors tend to overreact to other 
shocks that move stock prices, such as shifts in investor sentiment or liquidity shocks. 
In the present study, I focus on another factor which may potentially contribute to large stock price 
changes and may be subsequently connected to post-event returns. Namely, I consider the direction of 
change in the investors’ market volatility expectations, represented by the changes in the value of VIX 
index, which is calculated from the prices of S&P 500 Index options and is widely known as investors’ 
“fear gauge”, since in most cases, high VIX reflects increased investors’ fear and low VIX suggests 
complacency (Whaley, 2000, 2008). In addition to analyzing VIX as an indicator of future economic 
conditions, recent literature increasingly pays attention to its potential psychological components. 
Following the psychological “risk-as-feelings” model by Loewenstein et al. (2001), claiming that good 
(bad) mood may cause people to perceive positive (negative) future outcomes as more probable, Kliger 
and Kudryavtsev (2013) suggest that the changes in the value of VIX may be negatively correlated with 
contemporaneous investors’ mood, and empirically document that positive (negative) excess stock 
returns following analyst recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are stronger when accompanied by 
decreases (increases) in the daily value of VIX, the latter serving as a proxy for relatively good (bad) 
contemporaneous investors’ mood. Following the same logic, I expect that if a major positive stock 
price move takes place on a day when the value of VIX falls, then its magnitude may be amplified by 
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positive investors’ mood, and similarly, if a major negative stock price move takes place on a day when 
the value of VIX rises, then its magnitude may be amplified by negative investors’ mood. In other 
words, I suggest that if a positive company-specific shock, either public or unobserved, occurs on a day 
when the value of VIX falls, then from the investors’ point of view, positive mood (or decreased 
volatility expectations) increase the subjective probability that the shock will lead to a major positive 
stock price move and, therefore, amplify the magnitude of the price move itself, and similarly, if a 
negative company-specific shock occurs on a day when the value of VIX rises, then from the investors’ 
point of view, negative mood (or increased volatility expectations) increase the subjective probability 
that the shock will lead to a major negative stock price move and, thus, amplify the magnitude of the 
move. In both cases, investors’ mood may modify their perceptions and cause price overreaction to the 
company-specific shock, or in other words, to make the major stock price move resulting from the 
shock even more pronounced. Therefore, I hypothesize that large stock price changes taking place on 
the days when the value of VIX moves in the opposite direction may contain an element of 
overreaction and should be followed by significantly more pronounced reversals.  
I employ daily price data for all S&P 500 index constituents over the period from 1993 to 2016. I 
define events (large daily stock price moves) according to a number of alternative proxies, employing 
both raw and abnormal stock returns, and both absolute and relative (scaled by the respective stock’s 
volatility) return thresholds. Consistently with most of the previous literature, looking at the total 
sample of events, for different post-event periods, I find either non-significant or marginally significant 
reversals following both positive and negative price moves. Moreover, the magnitude and the 
significance of the post-event reversals appear to be virtually independent of the magnitude of the 
initial price shocks. On the other hand, after classifying the large stock price moves according to the 
direction of change in VIX on the event day, I find supportive evidence for my research hypothesis. 
Namely, both positive and negative stock price moves accompanied by the opposite-sign daily changes 
in the value of VIX are followed by significant reversals on each of the next two trading days and over 
five- and twenty-day intervals following the event, the magnitude of the reversals increasing over 
longer post-event windows, while large stock price changes taking place on the days when the value of 
VIX moves in the same direction are followed by non-significant price drifts. The results remain robust 
after accounting for additional company-specific (size, beta, historical volatility) and event-specific 
(stock’s return and trading volume on the event day) factors, and are stronger for low capitalization and 
high volatility stocks.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature dealing with stock 
returns following large price changes, as well as the literature focusing on mood, and its economic 
applications, and VIX index. In Section 3, I define and explain my research hypothesis. Section 4 
presents the database and the methodology. Section 5 describes the empirical tests and reports the 
results. Section 6 concludes and provides a brief discussion. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Stock Returns Following Large Price Changes 
Many authors have analyzed stock returns following large price changes, which are also in the focus of 
this study. A number of studies document stock price reversals following large price moves, and 
respectively, following the logic of a broad strand of literature dealing with the nature of reversals (e.g., 
DeBondt & Thaler, 1985; Lo & MacKinlay, 1990; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Daniel et al., 1998; 
Hong & Stein, 1999), suggest that the large price moves contain some element of overreaction to 
unobserved stimuli. Renshaw (1984) and Bremer and Sweeney (1991) argue that on average, stocks 
whose prices declined by at least 10% exhibit reversals and significantly outperform the market as a 
whole. Howe (1986) examines more extreme weekly stock changes over the period 1963-1981, setting 
the absolute trigger value to 50%. His results indicate that the overreaction phenomenon in the short 
run cannot be accounted for by the December-January seasonal pattern. Neither the size of the trigger 
return nor the period in which the extreme return occurred significantly influences his findings. Brown 
et al. (1988) analyze the reaction of monthly stock returns to an extremely negative one-period return. 
Testing for the directional effect, the magnitude effect and the intensity effect, the authors reveal 
evidence consistent with overreaction. Extending the work based on monthly data, Zarowin (1989) 
tests the short-run market overreaction also using their portfolio approach, following DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987). He confirms the evidence regarding the existence of stock market overreaction in 
the short run. Conrad et al. (1994) show that return reversals for relatively small NASDAQ stocks 
decrease with trading volume, while Cooper (1999) states that return reversals for larger NYSE stocks 
increase with trading volume. Sturm (2003) documents that negative price shocks generally trigger 
positive post-event abnormal returns, but this relationship is altered when the shocks are 
cross-sectionalized by certain pre-event characteristics, which may proxy for investor confidence. 
Additionally, he argues that post-event reversals are smaller for larger price shocks, since investors are 
more likely to attribute the latter to stable causes. Avramov et al. (2006) find that volume-induced 
return reversals increase with stock illiquidity.  
On the other hand, Atkins and Dyl (1990), in their search for excess profits during the first few days 
after extreme price declines, find evidence supporting the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Using bid-ask 
spreads, they show that the positive abnormal returns resulting from reversals are too small to generate 
profitable arbitrage. Lehmann (1990) detects the existence of short-term corrections to negative events 
for weekly returns, but after including transaction costs, these positive returns obtained actually vanish. 
Cox and Peterson (1994) also reject the overreaction hypothesis. They investigate the role of the 
bid-ask bounce and market liquidity in explaining price reversals in the 3-day period immediately 
following one-day price drops of at least 10%. The authors show that large one-day price declines are 
associated with strong selling pressure, which increases the probability that the closing transaction is 
made at the bid price. The reversal found for the next day is therefore set about by the bid-ask bounce. 
Furthermore, they find that the degree of the reversals following large price declines wanes through 
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time, and these events experience negative cumulative abnormal returns over 4-20 days following the 
event. Using the mid-point of bid-ask prices, Park (1995) shows that predictable variation in stock 
returns following large price changes is in part driven by the bid-ask bounce. Controlling for this effect, 
he finds that the short-run price reversals are not tradable. Similarly, Hamelink (1999) looks at stocks 
listed on the French stock exchange, and discovers significant post-extreme return patterns but taking 
the bid-ask spread into account, cannot support the overreaction hypothesis. Fehle and Zdorovtsov 
(2003) support his findings. Ratner and Leal (1998) perform their research on emerging markets of 
Latin America and Asia and find no evidence of any price reversals. Bremer et al. (1997) discover the 
reversal pattern for the Japanese stock market, but conclude that investors cannot earn arbitrage profits. 
Their results indicate that the market absorbs the information causing stock prices to change almost 
immediately. Lasfer et al. (2003), studying the price behavior of daily market indices of both developed 
and emerging markets worldwide, are also unable to gather any evidence in favor of the price reversal 
hypothesis. Mazouz et al. (2009) calculate abnormal post-event (large price move) returns according to 
three alternative stock pricing models, and find no evidence in support of overreaction. Moreover, they 
present some evidence of price drifts following positive price shocks.  
More recently, the emphasis has moved to the link between the large stock price changes and the public 
information. Pritamani and Singal (2001) study a subset of NYSE and AMEX stocks that experienced 
large price changes between 1990 and 1992. They also collect for this subset of stocks daily news 
stories from the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones News Wire, and document that conditional on a 
public announcement or volume increase associated with a large price change, these stocks exhibit 
momentum, yet, unconditional post-event abnormal returns are economically insignificant, though 
sometimes statistically significant. Chan (2003) constructs an index of news headlines for a random 
subset of Center for Research in Security Prices stocks that have experienced large price moves, and 
finds momentum after news, which is in line with a number of studies suggesting that investors tend to 
underreact to news about fundamentals (e.g., Michaely & Womack, 1999; Ikenberry & Ramnath, 2002; 
Vega, 2006), and reversals after no news, with the effect mostly driven by loser stocks. The reversals 
are statistically significant, even after controlling for size and book-to-market value. He also finds that 
the effects diminish, but are present, when one eliminates low-priced stocks, and are stronger among 
smaller and more illiquid stocks than among larger ones. A possible explanation he suggests is that 
some investors are slow to react to information, and transaction costs prevent arbitrageurs from 
eliminating the lag. Larson and Madura (2003) show that large price changes unaccompanied by public 
(newspaper) announcements favor the overreaction hypothesis, while extreme price declines after news 
being revealed publicly, merely display price continuation. Tetlock (2010) uses the entire daily Dow 
Jones news archive from 1979 to 2007 to study how presence of public news affects subsequent returns, 
and finds that reversals are significantly lower after news days and that for many stocks, 
volume-induced momentum exists only on these days. In line with Chan (2003), Savor (2012) finds 
that price events accompanied by information (analyst recommendation revisions) are followed by 
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drifts, while no-information ones result in reversals. The drifts exist only when the direction of the 
price move and of the change in analyst recommendations have the same sign. The author’s 
interpretation of these results is that investors underreact to news about fundamentals and overreact to 
other shocks that move stock prices (such as shifts in investor sentiment or liquidity shocks). He also 
argues that analysts can distinguish between these two potential drivers of stock returns, but the market 
does not fully take into account the information (or lack thereof) analysts provide. 
2.2 Mood: Psychological Aspects and Economic Applications. VIX Index 
Hilgard’s Introduction to Psychology (Hilgard, 2000, p. 404) defines mood as an enduring emotional 
state that affects people’s evaluation of other people and inanimate objects. Mood also affects 
judgments about the frequency of various risks. Good (bad) mood leads people to see risks as less 
(more) likely. Being in a bad mood makes the world seem more dangerous. The influence of mood on 
people’s perceptions and decisions is the focus of a large body of psychological research. One of the 
central conclusions in this respect is that people in positive mood tend to make optimistic judgments, 
while people in negative mood tend to make pessimistic judgments (e.g., Isen et al., 1978; Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983; Forgas, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), Kahneman and Riis (2006)). Furthermore, 
Schwarz (1990) finds that individuals in good mood engage in more simplifying heuristics to aid 
decisions, and Isen (2000) argues that positive mood increases cognitive flexibility. Schwarz (1990), 
however, suggests that bad mood tends to stimulate people to engage in detailed analytical activity, and 
subsequently, Schwarz (2002) concludes that negative mood is related to increased attention, more 
search of new alternatives, and a more thorough processing of available information. 
A number of psychological studies analyze the relationship between people’s subjective evaluations of 
future risk and their contemporaneous feelings and emotions. Constans and Mathews (1993) indicate 
that contemporaneous people’s mood is negatively correlated with their subjective evaluations of future 
risk. Wright and Bower (1992) argue that people’s mood affects their judgments with respect to 
uncertain future events, by documenting that people in good (bad) mood report higher (lower) 
probabilities for positive future events and lower (higher) probabilities for negative future events. 
Loewenstein et al. (2001) employ their “risk-as-feelings” model primarily to incorporate the fact that 
the emotions people experience at the time of making a decision influence their eventual decision. They 
argue that various aspects of the decision-making process, in particular, those involving risk and 
uncertainty are influenced by the feelings of the decision-maker.  
The effects of mood on financial markets are widely-documented in recent literature. Bad mood, being 
expressed by a number of psychologically motivated proxies, like high levels of cloudiness (e.g., 
Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003; Kliger & Levy, 2003a, 2003b), high temperatures (Cao 
& Wei, 2005), heightened geomagnetic storms (Krivelyova & Robotti, 2003), cycles of full moon 
(Dichev & Janes, 2003; Yuan et al., 2006), Daylight Savings Time Changes (Kamstra et al., 2000) and 
small number of daylight hours (Kamstra et al., 2003) result in significantly lower stock returns. In 
addition, Mehra and Sah (2002) suggest that investors’ mood has an effect on equity prices if it affects 
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investors’ “subjective parameters” (such as level of risk aversion and judgment of the appropriate 
discount factor). Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that stocks that are attractive to optimists and 
speculators and at the same time unattractive to arbitrageurs-younger stocks, small stocks, unprofitable 
stocks, non-dividend paying stocks, high volatility stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks 
are especially likely to be disproportionately sensitive to broad waves of investor sentiment. Kliger and 
Levy (2003a) employ option price data to recover risk preferences, finding that good (bad) mood is 
associated with investors being less (more) willing to tolerate risk, and Kliger and Levy (2003b) find 
that bad mood, proxied by high cloud cover and precipitation volume, is characterized by investors 
placing higher-than-usual probabilities on adverse events, Kliger and Levy (2008) employing option 
prices, show that seasonal mood effects distort investors’ probability perceptions, and Kliger et al. 
(2012) document seasonal impact on investors’ demand for initial public offerings.  
One of the financial indices that may be directly connected to investors’ mood is the implied Volatility 
Index (VIX), introduced by Whaley (1993) and launched by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE) in 1993. VIX is based on the prices of S&P 500 index options, providing thereby a benchmark 
for the expected future market volatility over the next month. The index is calculated in real-time and is 
continuously disseminated throughout each trading day. VIX is widely followed and has been cited in 
hundreds of news articles in leading financial publications. Along with the view of VIX as an indicator 
of future economic conditions, it is also known as the investors’ “fear gauge” (see Whaley, 2000, 2008). 
According to this interpretation, though there are other factors affecting this index, in most cases, high 
VIX reflects increased investors’ fear and low VIX suggests complacency. Whaley (2008) documents 
negative correlation between daily S&P 500 index returns and VIX changes, and interprets it as 
indicating that changes in the VIX are partially driven by investors demanding portfolio insurance in 
times of high current market volatility. 
Following the “risk-as-feelings” model by Loewenstein et al. (2001), indicating that decision-makers’ 
feelings may affect their way of treating risk and uncertainty, Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2013) suggest 
that the changes in the value of VIX may be negatively correlated with contemporaneous investors’ 
mood. They find supportive empirical evidence, documenting that positive (negative) excess stock 
returns following analyst recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are stronger when accompanied by 
decreases (increases) in the daily value of VIX. The basic intuition behind this finding is that investors 
in good (bad) mood should perceive positive (negative) future financial outcomes as more probable and, 
thus, react in a stronger way to analyst recommendation upgrades (downgrades). 
 
3. Research Hypothesis 
The goal of the present study is to analyze if investors’ mood may cause them to overreact to both 
public and private news, amplifying the magnitude of the large stock price moves. Based on the 
evidence presented in the previous Subsection, I employ the daily changes in the value of VIX as a 
proxy for the contemporaneous investors’ mood. 
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Following the model by Loewenstein et al. (2001), which suggests that good (bad) mood may cause 
people to perceive positive (negative) future outcomes as more probable, I hypothesize that major 
positive (negative) stock price moves taking place on the days when the value of VIX falls (rises) may 
incorporate a component driven by investors’ mood, which corresponds in these cases to the direction 
of the price moves. In other words, I expect that if the direction of a company-specific shock, either 
public or unobserved, corresponds to the quality of the contemporaneous investors’ mood, proxied by 
the daily changes in VIX, then investors may consider the shock to have a greater subjective 
probability of leading to stock returns of the respective sign, which increases the magnitude of the 
shock, creating overreaction. This hypothesis is consistent with the findings by Kliger and Kudryavtsev 
(2013), suggesting that abnormal stock price reactions to positive (negative) company-specific news 
are more pronounced if the latter are accompanied by decreases (increases) in the daily value of VIX.  
Since stock price overreaction to news results in subsequent reversals, this study’s main hypothesis 
may be formulated as: 
Hypothesis: Negative (positive) stock price reversals following large positive (negative) daily stock 
price changes should be significantly more pronounced if on the day of the initial price change, the 
daily value of VIX index falls (rises).  
 
4. Data Description and Methodology 
In my empirical analysis, I employ the adjusted daily price and volume data for all the constituents of 
S&P 500 Index over the period from 1993 to 2016, as recorded at www.finance.yahoo.com by May 
2017. Daily values of the S&P 500 Index, which I use as a proxy for the general stock market index, 
and those of the VIX Index are downloaded from this website as well. For each large price move (as 
defined in the sequel), I match the underlying firm’s market capitalization, as recorded on a quarterly 
basis at http://ycharts.com/, for the closest preceding date. 
I define large daily stock price changes using three alternative proxies, and two return thresholds for 
each of them: 
Proxy A: Daily raw stock returns with absolute values exceeding 8% ( %80 iSR ) and 10% 
( %100 iSR ), where SR0i represents the event-day (Day 0) stock return corresponding to event (large 
stock price move) i: The 10-percent threshold is commonly used in previous literature and should be 
high enough to screen out most price movements that do not reflect either substantial changes in 
fundamentals (or market perception thereof) or in investor sentiment, defined by Shleifer (2000, pp. 
11-12) as “beliefs based on heuristics rather than Bayesian rationality”. The 8-percent threshold allows 
to substantially increase the working sample (Note 1).  
Proxy B: Daily raw stock returns with absolute values exceeding three ( iiSR 30  ) and four standard 
deviations ( iiSR 40  ) of the respective stock’s daily returns over 250 trading days (roughly a year) 
preceding the event: The logic behind this approach, employed in a number of studies (e.g., Pritamani 
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& Singal, 2001) is that what constitutes a significant price change is different for high-volatility and 
low-volatility stocks. 
Proxy C: Daily abnormal stock returns (ARs) with absolute values exceeding 8% ( %80 iAR ) and 
10% ( %100 iAR ), where AR0i (Day-0 AR corresponding to event i) is calculated using Market 
Model Adjusted Returns (MMAR) (Note 2) with beta estimated for the respective stock over 250 
trading days preceding event i: Once again, the 10-percent threshold is the one commonly used in 
previous literature (e.g., Atkins & Dyl, 1990; Bremer & Sweeney, 1991), while the 8-percent threshold 
increases the sample of events.  
Employing absolute (Proxies A and C), rather than relative (Proxy B), thresholds has its relative 
advantages. Return volatility is not exogenous, reflecting the industry a firm operates in and the degree 
to which investor sentiment or liquidity shocks affect trading activity in the stock. For example, 
Internet stocks in the late 1990s were extremely volatile, at least partly due to the influence of shifting 
investor sentiment, which makes those stocks of particular interest for my analysis. If I adjusted their 
returns to take into account their high volatility, I would lose many observations where significant 
changes in fundamentals or investor sentiment occurred. Absolute thresholds do mean that my sample 
is biased towards highly volatile stocks, but again, those stocks might be the ones I am more interested 
in the first place. In any case, this assumption is not crucial for my findings, all of which continue to 
hold if I scale returns by their lagged volatility. 
I include large stock price changes in my working sample, provided (i) there were historical trading 
data for at least 250 trading days before, and 20 days after the event; (ii) market capitalization 
information was available for the respective stocks; and (iii) the absolute value of the price changes did 
not exceed 50%. The intersection of these filtering rules yields a working sample of the following sizes 
for the three definition proxies and the first (second) threshold:  
 For proxy A: 6,123 (3,914) large price moves, including 2,825 (1,591) increases and 3,298 (2,323) 
decreases. 
 For proxy B: 6,564 (3,934) large price moves, including 2,992 (1,627) increases and 3,572 (2,307) 
decreases. 
 For proxy C: 5,503 (3,540) large price moves, including 2,431 (1,251) increases and 3,072 (1,989) 
decreases. 
 
5. Results Description  
5.1 Stock Returns Following Large Price Moves: Total Sample 
First of all, I employ the total sample of large stock price moves and analyze the respective stocks’ 
returns following the initial moves. Table 1 comprises average ARs, calculated using MMAR (Note 3), 
and their statistical significance, for the period of up to 20 trading days following large stock price 
increases and decreases, defined according to the three above-mentioned proxies and two thresholds for 
each of them. Day 1 refers to the first trading day after the initial price move. 
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Table 1. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases: Total 
Sample  
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(2,825 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(1,591 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(2,992 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(1,627 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(2,431 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,251 events) 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
-0.12 
(30.15%) 
 
-0.13 
(29.98%) 
 
-0.17 
(30.21%) 
 
-0.18 
(32.56%) 
-0.13 
(31.20%) 
 
-0.12 
(34.82%) 
 
-0.22 
(26.15%) 
 
-0.21 
(29.87%) 
-0.14 
(29.77%) 
 
-0.11 
(39.10%) 
 
-0.18 
(29.75%) 
 
-0.20 
(28.66%) 
-0.18 
(24.01%) 
 
-0.12 
(38.25%) 
 
-0.16 
(34.25%) 
 
-0.18 
(31.05%) 
-0.17 
(26.11%) 
 
-0.11 
(38.41%) 
 
-0.14 
(39.88%) 
 
-0.19 
(30.23%) 
-0.19 
(24.51%) 
 
-0.13 
(35.53%) 
 
-0.15 
(43.41%) 
 
-0.19 
(34.13%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(3,298 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(2,323 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(3,572 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(2,307 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(3,072 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,989 events) 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.18 
(23.44%) 
 
0.13 
(31.33%) 
 
0.36 
(19.05%) 
 
0.42 
(14.21%) 
0.17 
(24.56%) 
 
0.15 
(33.34%) 
 
0.34 
(22.62%) 
 
0.41 
(16.02%) 
0.19 
(20.37%) 
 
0.14 
(30.98%) 
 
0.42 
(13.47%) 
 
*0.46 
(9.92%) 
0.17 
(21.41%) 
 
0.15 
(32.25%) 
 
0.36 
(22.10%) 
 
0.43 
(12.35%) 
0.16 
(28.71%) 
 
0.14 
(37.03%) 
 
0.38 
(18.23%) 
 
0.41 
(15.64%) 
0.18 
(21.54%) 
 
0.15 
(30.88%) 
 
0.39 
(14.98%) 
 
*0.44 
(9.83%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10. 
 
The results in the Table are consistent with most of the previous literature. For the total sample of large 
price moves, there are non-significant reversals following positive price moves, and either 
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non-significant or marginally significant reversals following negative price moves, the former being 
slightly more pronounced for the time window 1 to 20. The results are similar for all the proxies 
according to which the events are defined and for all the thresholds. Moreover, the magnitude and the 
significance of the post-event reversals appear to be virtually independent of the magnitude of the 
initial price shocks. 
5.2 Effect of Mood on Stock Returns Following Large Price Moves 
In order to perform the first general test of my research hypothesis, similarly to Kliger and Kudryavtsev 
(2013), I divide the total sample of events (large stock price moves) by the direction of change in the 
value of VIX corresponding to Day 0.  
Tables 2A, 2B and 2C report average ARs following large price moves, by the sign of Day-0 VIX 
change (∆VIX), as well as the respective AR differences and their statistical significance, for event 
definition proxies A, B and C, respectively. The results corroborate my research hypothesis with 
respect to the effect of event-day investors’ mood, proxied by the sign of ∆VIX, on post-event ARs. 
First of all, with all the proxies, large price increases (decreases) are followed by significant price 
reversals if the initial price moves take place on the days when the value of VIX falls (rises), 
suggesting that in these cases, the price moves may contain an element of overreaction. The magnitude 
of these price reversals increases for longer post-event periods, so that for the post-event window 1 to 
20, average ARs following large price increases, which took place on the days when ∆VIX<0, reach 
-0.72%, -0.69% and -0.71%, for the lower threshold, according to proxies A, B and C, respectively, 
while average ARs following large price decreases, which took place on the days when ∆VIX>0, are 
even more pronounced and equal 1.11%, 1.13% and 1.15%, according to proxies A, B and C, 
respectively, all the ARs being highly statistically significant. On the other hand, large price increases 
(decreases) which occur on the days when the value of VIX rises (falls) result in non-significant stock 
price drifts for all the post-event windows. AR differences for the post-event period between the two 
mood-related conditions are highly significant and also become more pronounced for longer event 
windows. According to the three event definition proxies, for the Days 1 to 20, AR differences between 
∆VIX>0 and ∆VIX<0 conditions equal 1.00%, 0.96% and 1.02%, following large price increases, and 
even more impressive 1.53%, 1.56% and 1.59%, following large price decreases.  
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Table 2A. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy A for Defining Large Price Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,378 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,447 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(773 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(818 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.15 
(29.57%) 
 
0.02 
(58.66%) 
 
0.24 
(25.81%) 
 
0.28 
(21.03%) 
**-0.39 
(1.87%) 
 
*-0.18 
(8.92%) 
 
***-0.67 
(0.77%) 
 
***-0.72 
(0.25%) 
***0.54 
(0.19%) 
 
*0.20 
(5.87%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.11%) 
 
***1.00 
(0.03%) 
0.16 
(31.41%) 
 
0.03 
(51.71%) 
 
0.26 
(24.78%) 
 
0.29 
(19.68%) 
**-0.40 
(1.75%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.68%) 
 
***-0.69 
(0.58%) 
 
***-0.73 
(0.21%) 
***0.56 
(0.12%) 
 
*0.20 
(6.44%) 
 
***0.95 
(0.06%) 
 
***1.02 
(0.02%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,594 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,704 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(1,128 events)
∆VIX<0 
(1,195 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
**0.58 
(1.50%) 
 
*0.22 
(8.87%) 
 
***0.90 
(0.05%) 
 
***1.11 
(0.02%) 
-0.24 
(19.56%) 
 
-0.07 
(44.01%) 
 
-0.20 
(30.68%) 
 
-0.42 
(18.20%) 
***0.82 
(0.13%) 
 
*0.29 
(5.52%) 
 
***1.10 
(0.05%) 
 
***1.53 
(0.00%) 
**0.59 
(1.48%) 
 
*0.24 
(8.04%) 
 
***0.92 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.13 
(0.02%) 
-0.25 
(19.12%) 
 
-0.07 
(45.14%) 
 
-0.21 
(31.05%) 
 
-0.43 
(17.75%) 
***0.84 
(0.11%) 
 
*0.31 
(5.12%) 
 
***1.13 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.56 
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 2B. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy B for Defining Large Price Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(1,438 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,554 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(791 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(836 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.14 
(30.24%) 
 
0.02 
(57.62%) 
 
0.23 
(26.84%) 
 
0.27 
(22.61%) 
**-0.39 
(1.78%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.25%) 
 
***-0.65 
(0.90%) 
 
***-0.69 
(0.31%) 
***0.53 
(0.22%) 
 
*0.19 
(6.33%) 
 
***0.88 
(0.17%) 
 
***0.96 
(0.04%) 
0.15 
(32.70%) 
 
0.02 
(62.01%) 
 
0.25 
(25.23%) 
 
0.28 
(20.31%) 
**-0.40 
(1.68%) 
 
*-0.16 
(9.75%) 
 
***-0.68 
(0.59%) 
 
***-0.71 
(0.23%) 
***0.55 
(0.13%) 
 
*0.18 
(7.02%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.07%) 
 
***0.99 
(0.03%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(1,723 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,849 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(1,122 events)
∆VIX<0 
(1,185 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
**0.59 
(1.35%) 
 
*0.21 
(9.08%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.13 
(0.00%) 
-0.25 
(18.67%) 
 
-0.08 
(39.85%) 
 
-0.21 
(28.42%) 
 
-0.43 
(16.65%) 
***0.84 
(0.09%) 
 
*0.29 
(5.45%) 
 
***1.12 
(0.02%) 
 
***1.56 
(0.00%) 
**0.60 
(1.40%) 
 
*0.25 
(7.53%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.15 
(0.01%) 
-0.26 
(18.23%) 
 
-0.07 
(48.03%) 
 
-0.22 
(30.41%) 
 
-0.44 
(15.81%) 
***0.86 
(0.08%) 
 
*0.32 
(5.10%) 
 
***1.15 
(0.01%) 
 
***1.59  
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 2C. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy C for Defining Large Price Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,176 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,255 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(605 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(646 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.17 
(24.21%) 
 
0.04 
(46.35%) 
 
0.27 
(22.31%) 
 
0.31 
(18.43%) 
**-0.41 
(1.12%) 
 
*-0.18 
(9.01%) 
 
***-0.67 
(0.83%) 
 
***-0.71 
(0.26%) 
***0.58 
(0.12%) 
 
*0.22 
(5.36%) 
 
***0.94 
(0.06%) 
 
***1.02 
(0.00%) 
0.18 
(29.66%) 
 
0.03 
(55.40%) 
 
0.28 
(20.57%) 
 
0.32 
(20.02%) 
**-0.43 
(1.11%) 
 
*-0.18 
(9.26%) 
 
***-0.69 
(0.54%) 
 
***-0.73 
(0.18%) 
***0.61 
(0.08%) 
 
*0.21 
(5.87%) 
 
***0.97 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.05 
(0.00%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,498 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,574 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(962 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,027 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
**0.60 
(1.32%) 
 
*0.21 
(9.19%) 
 
***0.92 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.15 
(0.00%) 
-0.26 
(18.03%) 
 
-0.09 
(34.56%) 
 
-0.22 
(26.50%) 
 
-0.44 
(15.23%) 
***0.86 
(0.06%) 
 
*0.30 
(5.14%) 
 
***1.14 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.59 
(0.00%) 
**0.61 
(1.37%) 
 
*0.25 
(7.67%) 
 
***0.94 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.16 
(0.00%) 
-0.27 
(17.59%) 
 
-0.08 
(45.61%) 
 
-0.24 
(26.82%) 
 
-0.46 
(12.37%) 
***0.88 
(0.06%) 
 
**0.33 
(4.81%) 
 
***1.18 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.62  
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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5.3 Effect of Mood on the Post-Event Stock Returns within Different Stock Groups  
In this Subsection, I analyze the magnitude of the post-event stock price reversals and of AR 
differences between the two mood-related conditions, by firm size (market capitalization) and by 
historical volatility of stock returns. The motivation for this analysis is based on the findings by Baker 
and Wurgler (2006), who argue that stocks of low capitalization stocks, growth stocks, and highly 
volatile stocks are especially likely to be disproportionately sensitive to broad waves of investor 
sentiment. 
First, I concentrate on the effect of firm size. For each of the three event definition proxies and 
separately for large price increases and decreases, I split the samples of events into three roughly equal 
parts by the firms’ market capitalization (high, medium and low) reported for the end of the quarter 
preceding each large price move. Tables 3A, 3B and 3C exhibit, for proxies A, B and C, average 
post-event ARs, by the sign of ∆VIX, as well as the respective AR differences and their statistical 
significance, for high and low market capitalization firms. Consistently with Baker and Wurgler (2006), 
the Day-0 mood effect on post-event stock ARs following both large price increases and large price 
decreases is stronger for low capitalization stocks. This result is twofold: (i) for small stocks, in cases 
when the direction of the initial price move corresponds to the contemporaneous investors’ mood 
proxied by ∆VIX, the magnitude of post-event price reversals is larger (e.g., according to the two 
thresholds of proxy A, for post-event window 1 to 20, average ARs following large price increases 
taking place on the days when ∆VIX<0 equal -0.54% and -0.53% for high capitalization stocks, and 
-0.91% and -0.92% for low capitalization stocks, while average ARs following large price decreases 
taking place on the days when ∆VIX>0 equal 0.85% and 0.83% for high capitalization stocks, and 
1.36% and 1.38% for low capitalization stocks); and (ii) for small stocks, AR differences for the 
post-event period between the two mood conditions are greater (e.g., according to the two thresholds of 
proxy A, for post-event window 1 to 20, following large price increases, average AR differences 
between the ∆VIX>0 and ∆VIX<0 conditions are 0.72% and 0.70% for high capitalization stocks, and 
1.30% and 1.33% for low capitalization stocks, while following large price decreases, average AR 
differences between the ∆VIX>0 and ∆VIX<0 conditions are 1.16% and 1.13% for high capitalization 
stocks, and 1.89% and 1.95% for low capitalization stocks) (Note 4).  
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Table 3A. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX, for High and Low Market Capitalization Firms: Proxy A for Defining Large Price 
Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low market capitalization firms, %  
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(459/459 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(482/482 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(257/258 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(272/273 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
0.02/0.25 
 
-0.03/0.06 
 
0.15/0.31 
 
0.18/0.39 
*-0.21/**-0.52 
 
-0.10/*-0.27 
 
*-0.50/**-0.83 
 
**-0.54/***-0.91 
*0.23/**0.77 
 
0.07/*0.33 
 
**0.65/***1.14 
 
**0.72/***1.30 
0.01/0.26 
 
-0.03/0.07 
 
0.14/0.32 
 
0.17/0.41 
*-0.20/**-0.53 
 
-0.09/*-0.27 
 
*-0.48/**-0.85 
 
**-0.53/***-0.92 
*0.21/**0.79 
 
0.06/*0.34 
 
**0.62/***1.17 
 
**0.70/***1.33 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low market capitalization firms, % 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(531/531 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(568/568 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(376/376 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(398/398 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
*0.40/**0.71 
 
0.16/*0.28 
 
**0.67/***1.09 
 
***0.85/***1.36 
-0.16/-0.30 
 
-0.03/-0.10 
 
-0.14/-0.26 
 
-0.31/*-0.54 
**0.56/***1.01 
 
0.19/*0.38 
 
**0.81/***1.35 
 
***1.16/***1.89 
*0.38/**0.72 
 
0.15/*0.30 
 
**0.64/***1.09 
 
***0.83/***1.38 
-0.15/-0.31 
 
-0.01/-0.11 
 
-0.14/-0.28 
 
-0.30/*-0.57 
**0.53/***1.03 
 
0.16/*0.41 
 
**0.78/***1.37 
 
***1.13/***1.95 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijafs        International Journal of Accounting and Finance Studies           Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018 
110 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Table 3B. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX, for High and Low Market Capitalization Firms: Proxy B for Defining Large Price 
Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days 
relative to 
event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low market capitalization firms, %  
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(479/479 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(518/518 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(263/264 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(278/279 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
0.04/0.23 
 
-0.02/0.07 
 
0.16/0.30 
 
0.20/0.38 
*-0.22/**-0.50 
 
-0.11/*-0.25 
 
*-0.51/**-0.80 
 
**-0.55/***-0.87 
*0.26/**0.73 
 
0.09/*0.32 
 
**0.67/***1.10 
 
**0.75/***1.25 
0.02/0.24 
 
-0.02/0.06 
 
0.15/0.29 
 
0.19/0.39 
*-0.21/**-0.51 
 
-0.10/*-0.26 
 
*-0.49/**-0.82 
 
**-0.54/***-0.88 
*0.23/**0.75 
 
0.08/*0.32 
 
**0.64/***1.11
 
**0.73/***1.27
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days 
relative to 
event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low market capitalization firms, % 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(574/574 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(616/616 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(374/374 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(395/395 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
*0.41/**0.68 
 
0.17/*0.26 
 
**0.68/***1.05 
 
***0.86/***1.31 
-0.17/-0.28 
 
-0.03/-0.08 
 
-0.15/-0.24 
 
-0.32/-0.50 
**0.58/***0.96 
 
0.20/*0.34 
 
**0.83/***1.29 
 
***1.18/***1.81 
*0.39/**0.69 
 
0.16/*0.28 
 
**0.65/***1.06 
 
***0.84/***1.34 
-0.16/-0.29 
 
-0.02/-0.09 
 
-0.16/-0.26 
 
-0.31/*-0.53 
**0.55/***0.98
 
0.18/*0.37 
 
**0.81/***1.32
 
***1.15/***1.87
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijafs        International Journal of Accounting and Finance Studies           Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018 
111 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Table 3C. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX, for High and Low Market Capitalization Firms: Proxy C for Defining Large Price 
Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low market capitalization firms, %  
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(392/392 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(418/418 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(201/202 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(215/215 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
0.04/0.26 
 
-0.01/0.10 
 
0.17/0.33 
 
0.19/0.42 
*-0.23/**-0.52 
 
-0.12/*-0.26 
 
*-0.52/**-0.83 
 
**-0.56/***-0.92 
*0.27/**0.78 
 
0.11/*0.36 
 
**0.69/***1.16 
 
**0.75/***1.34 
0.04/0.27 
 
-0.01/0.09 
 
0.16/0.32 
 
0.20/0.43 
*-0.22/**-0.53 
 
-0.11/*-0.28 
 
*-0.50/**-0.86 
 
**-0.55/***-0.94 
*0.26/**0.80 
 
0.10/*0.37 
 
**0.66/***1.18
 
**0.75/***1.37
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low market capitalization firms, % 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(499/499 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(524/525 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(320/321 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(342/342 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
*0.43/**0.73 
 
0.18/*0.29 
 
**0.69/***1.09 
 
***0.89/***1.38 
-0.19/-0.31 
 
-0.04/-0.11 
 
-0.17/-0.26 
 
-0.33/*-0.52 
**0.62/***1.04 
 
0.22/*0.40 
 
**0.86/***1.35 
 
***1.22/***1.90 
*0.44/**0.74 
 
0.17/*0.31 
 
**0.68/***1.11 
 
***0.87/***1.41 
-0.18/-0.32 
 
-0.04/-0.12 
 
-0.18/-0.29 
 
-0.32/*-0.55 
**0.62/***1.06
 
0.21/*0.43 
 
**0.86/***1.40
 
***1.19/***1.96
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Furthermore, I analyze the effect of historical stock volatility on the magnitude of the availability effect 
on post-event stock returns. For each of the three event definition proxies and separately for large price 
increases and decreases, I split the samples of events into three roughly equal parts by the standard 
deviation of stock returns over Days -250 to -1 (high, medium and low volatility stocks). Tables 4A, 4B 
and 4C present relevant AR statistics for high and low volatility stocks. Once again, in line with the 
previous literature, the magnitude of the mood effect on stock returns following large price moves, as 
expressed by the magnitude of post-event price reversals and the AR differences between the two 
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mood-related conditions, is stronger pronounced for more volatile stocks (Note 5). Thus, one may 
suggest that large price moves of low market capitalization and more volatile stocks are more affected 
by investors’ mood, possibly due to the reduced amount of information on these stocks and their higher 
risk levels. As a result, the post-event price reversals for these stocks are more pronounced (Note 6).  
 
Table 4A. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX, for High and Low Volatility Stocks: Proxy A for Defining Large Price Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low volatility stocks, %  
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(459/459 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(482/482 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(257/258 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(272/273 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
0.19/0.07 
 
0.04/0.00 
 
0.25/0.19 
 
0.35/0.23 
**-0.47/*-0.24 
 
*-0.24/-0.12 
 
**-0.76/*-0.55 
 
***-0.85/**-0.59 
**0.66/*0.31 
 
*0.28/0.12 
 
***1.01/**0.74 
 
***1.20/**0.82 
0.20/0.06 
 
0.05/-0.01 
 
0.27/0.18 
 
0.36/0.22 
**-0.48/*-0.25 
 
*-0.25/-0.13 
 
**-0.77/*-0.54 
 
***-0.87/**-0.59 
**0.68/*0.31 
 
*0.30/0.12 
 
***1.04/**0.72
 
***1.23/**0.81
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low volatility stocks, % 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(531/531 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(568/568 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(376/376 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(398/398 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
**0.63/*0.42 
 
*0.25/0.18 
 
***1.02/**0.69 
 
***1.28/***0.92 
-0.26/-0.20 
 
-0.08/-0.05 
 
-0.23/-0.17 
 
*-0.47/-0.35 
***0.89/**0.62 
 
*0.33/0.23 
 
***1.25/**0.86 
 
***1.75/***1.27 
**0.64/*0.43 
 
*0.26/0.17 
 
***1.04/**0.68 
 
***1.31/***0.93 
-0.27/-0.21 
 
-0.10/-0.04 
 
-0.26/-0.18 
 
*-0.48/-0.36 
***0.91/**0.64
 
*0.36/0.21 
 
***1.30/**0.86
 
***1.79/***1.29
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 4B. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX, for High and Low Volatility Stocks: Proxy B for Defining Large Price Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low volatility stocks, %  
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(479/479 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(518/518 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(263/264 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(278/279 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
0.17/0.08 
 
0.03/0.01 
 
0.24/0.18 
 
0.31/0.22 
**-0.44/*-0.22 
 
*-0.23/-0.11 
 
**-0.73/*-0.53 
 
***-0.80/**-0.56 
**0.61/*0.30 
 
*0.26/0.12 
 
***0.95/**0.71 
 
***1.11/**0.78 
0.18/0.06 
 
0.04/0.00 
 
0.24/0.16 
 
0.32/0.20 
**-0.45/*-0.24 
 
*-0.24/-0.12 
 
**-0.75/*-0.52 
 
***-0.83/**-0.56 
**0.63/*0.30 
 
*0.28/0.12 
 
***0.99/**0.68 
 
***1.15/**0.76 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low volatility stocks, % 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(574/574 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(616/616 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(374/374 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(395/395 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
**0.60/*0.40 
 
*0.23/0.17 
 
***0.98/**0.65 
 
***1.20/***0.87 
-0.25/-0.18 
 
-0.07/-0.03 
 
-0.20/-0.15 
 
*-0.44/-0.33 
***0.85/**0.58 
 
*0.30/0.20 
 
***1.18/**0.81 
 
***1.64/***1.20 
**0.62/*0.41 
 
*0.24/0.16 
 
***1.00/**0.65 
 
***1.24/***0.89 
-0.25/-0.20 
 
-0.10/-0.03 
 
-0.23/-0.16 
 
*-0.45/-0.34 
***0.87/**0.61 
 
*0.34/0.19 
 
***1.23/**0.81 
 
***1.69/***1.23
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 4C. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX, for High and Low Volatility Stocks: Proxy C for Defining Large Price Moves 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low volatility stocks, %  
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(392/392 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(418/418 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(201/202 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(215/215 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
0.21/0.07 
 
0.05/0.02 
 
0.27/0.20 
 
0.37/0.25 
**-0.48/*-0.25 
 
*-0.25/-0.12 
 
**-0.79/*-0.56 
 
***-0.88/**-0.60 
**0.69/*0.32 
 
*0.30/0.14 
 
***1.06/**0.76 
 
***1.25/**0.85 
0.22/0.07 
 
0.06/0.01 
 
0.29/0.19 
 
0.39/0.24 
**-0.49/*-0.26 
 
*-0.26/-0.13 
 
**-0.81/*-0.56 
 
***-0.92/**-0.61 
**0.71/*0.33 
 
*0.32/0.14 
 
***1.10/**0.75
 
***1.31/**0.85
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days 
relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes for high/low volatility stocks, % 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(499/499 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(524/525 events) 
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(320/321 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(342/342 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
2 
 
1 to 5 
 
1 to 20 
**0.65/*0.43 
 
*0.26/0.18 
 
***1.06/**0.71 
 
***1.32/***0.94 
-0.27/-0.20 
 
-0.09/-0.06 
 
-0.24/-0.18 
 
*-0.49/-0.36 
***0.92/**0.63 
 
*0.35/0.24 
 
***1.30/**0.89 
 
***1.81/***1.30 
**0.66/*0.44 
 
*0.27/0.17 
 
***1.07/**0.72 
 
***1.34/***0.95 
-0.28/-0.21 
 
-0.11/-0.05 
 
-0.27/-0.19 
 
*-0.50/-0.37 
***0.94/**0.65
 
*0.38/0.22 
 
***1.34/**0.91
 
***1.84/***1.32
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
5.4 Multifactor Analysis 
Having detected the effect of mood on stock returns following large price changes, I henceforth check 
its persistence controlling for additional firm-specific and event-specific factors. To do so, I run the 
following regressions, separately for large price increases and decreases, for the windows 1, 1 to 5 and 
1 to 20 following the events, and according to all the proxies and thresholds: 
itiiiiiiit
ABVOLSRvolatSRbetaMCapdumVIXAR   00__ 6543210             (1) 
where: ARit is the abnormal stock return following event i for post-event window t (Days 1, 1 to 5, or 1 
to 20); VIX_dumi is the dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the value of VIX corresponding to Day 0 
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for event i rises, and 0 otherwise; MCapi is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization 
corresponding to event i, normalized in the cross-section; betai is the estimated CAPM beta for event i, 
calculated over the Days -250 to -1 and normalized in the cross-section; SR_volati is the standard 
deviation of stock returns over the Days -250 to -1 corresponding to event i, normalized in the 
cross-section; |SR0|i is the absolute Day-0 stock return representing event i; and ABVOL0i is the 
abnormal Day-0 stock trading volume corresponding to event i, calculated as the difference between 
the stock’s actual Day-0 trading volume and its average trading volume over Days -250 to -1, 
normalized by the standard deviation of its trading volume over the same estimation window. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 report the regression coefficients for post-event windows 1, 1 to 5 and 1 to 20, 
respectively, providing the following results: 
 Regression coefficients on VIX_dum are positive and highly significant for all the post-event 
windows, which means that negative (positive) post-event price reversals following large 
price increases (decreases) are stronger if the latter take place on the days when the value of 
VIX falls (rises), suggesting that the large stock price moves may contain a mood-driven 
element of overreaction. Importantly, the effect persists and remains significant after 
controlling for additional factors affecting post-event ARs.  
 According to the signs of the coefficients on MCap, for low capitalization firms, post-event 
ARs following large price increases (decreases) are significantly lower (higher). That is, stock 
price reversals following large price moves are significantly stronger for small stocks.  
 Regression coefficients on beta following large price increases (decreases) are negative 
(positive), yet, marginally significant. Thus, one may suggest that stock price reversals 
following large price moves tend to be stronger for high-beta stocks, yet, controlling for other 
company-specific and event-specific factors, the significance of the effect is questionable. 
  Regression coefficients on SR_volat following large price increases (decreases) are 
significantly negative (positive), indicating that stock price reversals following large price 
moves are significantly stronger for more volatile stocks. 
 The coefficients on |SR0| and ABVOL0 are non-significant, demonstrating that the magnitude 
of post-event stock price reversals does not depend on the magnitude of the initial shocks, as 
expressed by both stock price change itself and the trading volume at the day of the shock.  
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Table 5. Multifactor Regression Analysis of ARs Following Large Stock Price Increases and 
Decreases: Dependent Variable—Stock AR for Day 1 Following the Event  
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient estimates, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(2,825 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(1,591 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(2,992 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(1,627 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(2,431 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,251 events) 
Intercept 
 
 
VIX_dum 
 
 
MCap 
 
 
beta 
 
 
SR_Volat 
 
 
|SR0| 
 
 
ABVOL0 
 
**0.08 
(3.21%) 
 
***0.47 
(0.41%) 
 
**0.21 
(3.84%) 
 
*-0.10 
(8.59%) 
 
*-0.20 
(6.12%) 
 
-0.03 
(48.27%) 
 
0.02 
(54.12%) 
**0.07 
(4.01%) 
 
***0.49 
(0.32%) 
 
**0.20 
(3.98%) 
 
*-0.12 
(8.12%) 
 
*-0.22 
(6.01%) 
 
-0.04 
(44.71%) 
 
0.01 
(65.25%) 
**0.09 
(3.01%) 
 
***0.45 
(0.47%) 
 
**0.22 
(3.41%) 
 
*-0.11 
(8.23%) 
 
*-0.19 
(6.43%) 
 
-0.05 
(36.52%) 
 
0.01 
(51.20%) 
**0.10 
(2.87%) 
 
***0.46 
(0.42%) 
 
**0.19 
(4.30%) 
 
*-0.10 
(9.01%) 
 
*-0.21 
(6.87%) 
 
-0.04 
(45.62%) 
 
0.02 
(48.75%) 
**0.07 
(3.56%) 
 
***0.48 
(0.35%) 
 
**0.18 
(4.02%) 
 
*-0.09 
(9.65%) 
 
*-0.19 
(6.43%) 
 
-0.04 
(45.31%) 
 
0.04 
(40.05%) 
**0.06 
(4.25%) 
 
***0.50 
(0.29%) 
 
**0.19 
(3.77%) 
 
*-0.11 
(8.21%) 
 
*-0.20 
(6.41%) 
 
-0.03 
(51.03%) 
 
0.02 
(54.62%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient estimates, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(3,298 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(2,323 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(3,572 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(2,307 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(3,072 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,989 events) 
Intercept 
 
 
VIX_dum 
 
 
***-0.45 
(0.11%) 
 
***0.62 
(0.12%) 
 
***-0.47 
(0.09%) 
 
***0.64 
(0.08%) 
 
***-0.44 
(0.18%) 
 
***0.60 
(0.19%) 
 
***-0.45 
(0.16%) 
 
***0.61 
(0.17%) 
 
***-0.47 
(0.09%) 
 
***0.64 
(0.07%) 
 
***-0.49 
(0.04%) 
 
***0.67 
(0.05%) 
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MCap 
 
 
beta 
 
 
SR_Volat 
 
 
|SR0| 
 
 
ABVOL0 
 
**-0.24 
(3.74%) 
 
*0.07 
(9.67%) 
 
**0.16 
(4.32%) 
 
0.02 
(74.23%) 
 
-0.03 
(41.34%) 
**-0.25 
(4.01%) 
 
*0.08 
(9.14%) 
 
**0.15 
(4.92%) 
 
0.01 
(72.03%) 
 
-0.04 
(38.60%) 
**-0.22 
(4.08%) 
 
*0.08 
(9.20%) 
 
**0.17 
(4.11%) 
 
0.00 
(98.37%) 
 
-0.02 
(52.37%) 
**-0.23 
(4.00%) 
 
*0.07 
(9.86%) 
 
**0.18 
(4.23%) 
 
0.01 
(86.71%) 
 
-0.05 
(34.52%) 
**-0.26 
(3.41%) 
 
*0.08 
(9.24%) 
 
**0.15 
(4.78%) 
 
0.03 
(67.25%) 
 
-0.01 
(86.37%) 
**-0.28 
(3.02%) 
 
*0.07 
(9.68%) 
 
**0.16 
(4.31%) 
 
0.02 
(51.32%) 
 
-0.02 
(49.98%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 6. Multifactor Regression Analysis of ARs Following Large Stock Price Increases and 
Decreases: Dependent Variable—Stock AR for Days 1 to 5 Following the Event  
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient estimates, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(2,825 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(1,591 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(2,992 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(1,627 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(2,431 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,251 events) 
Intercept 
 
 
VIX_dum 
 
 
MCap 
 
 
beta 
 
 
SR_Volat 
 
**0.11 
(1.87%) 
 
***0.78 
(0.00%) 
 
**0.20 
(3.21%) 
 
*-0.13 
(7.32%) 
 
**-0.24 
(3.84%) 
**0.10 
(2.03%) 
 
***0.79 
(0.00%) 
 
**0.21 
(3.13%) 
 
*-0.14 
(7.20%) 
 
**-0.23 
(4.08%) 
**0.12 
(1.45%) 
 
***0.76 
(0.00%) 
 
**0.22 
(3.02%) 
 
*-0.12 
(7.77%) 
 
**-0.25 
(3.12%) 
**0.11 
(1.72%) 
 
***0.77 
(0.00%) 
 
**0.21 
(3.53%) 
 
*-0.13 
(7.52%) 
 
**-0.24 
(3.30%) 
**0.10 
(1.98%) 
 
***0.79 
(0.00%) 
 
**0.19 
(3.82%) 
 
*-0.14 
(6.92%) 
 
**-0.23 
(3.52%) 
**0.09 
(2.35%) 
 
***0.81 
(0.00%) 
 
**0.21 
(3.17%) 
 
*-0.15 
(6.34%) 
 
**-0.24 
(3.41%) 
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|SR0| 
 
 
ABVOL0 
 
 
-0.04 
(32.21%) 
 
0.03 
(35.62%) 
 
-0.03 
(41.53%) 
 
0.02 
(48.67%) 
 
-0.05 
(27.51%) 
 
0.04 
(27.60%) 
 
-0.04 
(33.73%) 
 
0.03 
(34.37%) 
 
-0.05 
(25.42%) 
 
0.04 
(29.38%) 
 
-0.04 
(35.63%) 
 
0.03 
(36.28%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient estimates, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(3,298 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(2,323 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(3,572 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(2,307 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(3,072 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,989 events) 
Intercept 
 
 
VIX_dum 
 
 
MCap 
 
 
beta 
 
 
SR_Volat 
 
 
|SR0| 
 
 
ABVOL0 
 
***-0.41 
(0.03%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.00%) 
 
**-0.34 
(2.38%) 
 
*0.11 
(9.36%) 
 
*0.17 
(7.34%) 
 
0.04 
(45.68%) 
 
-0.05 
(37.39%) 
***-0.42 
(0.04%) 
 
***0.92 
(0.00%) 
 
**-0.35 
(2.25%) 
 
*0.12 
(9.07%) 
 
*0.16 
(7.88%) 
 
0.05 
(39.87%) 
 
-0.06 
(31.24%) 
***-0.39 
(0.06%) 
 
***0.89 
(0.00%) 
 
**-0.33 
(2.68%) 
 
*0.13 
(8.64%) 
 
*0.18 
(6.93%) 
 
0.03 
(50.31%) 
 
-0.04 
(53.29%) 
***-0.41 
(0.04%) 
 
***0.90 
(0.00%) 
 
**-0.34 
(2.52%) 
 
*0.12 
(7.96%) 
 
*0.17 
(7.66%) 
 
0.04 
(44.69%) 
 
-0.05 
(46.21%) 
***-0.43 
(0.02%) 
 
***0.92 
(0.00%) 
 
**-0.32 
(2.98%) 
 
*0.12 
(9.48%) 
 
*0.18 
(7.07%) 
 
0.05 
(38.29%) 
 
-0.03 
(58.39%) 
***-0.44 
(0.01%) 
 
***0.94 
(0.00%) 
 
**-0.33 
(2.68%) 
 
*0.10 
(9.89%) 
 
*0.17 
(7.63%) 
 
0.06 
(29.83%) 
 
-0.04 
(47.60%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 7. Multifactor Regression Analysis of ARs Following Large Stock Price Increases and 
Decreases: Dependent Variable—Stock AR for Days 1 to 20 Following the Event  
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient estimates, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(2,825 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(1,591 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(2,992 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(1,627 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(2,431 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,251 events) 
Intercept 
 
 
VIX_dum 
 
 
MCap 
 
 
beta 
 
 
SR_Volat 
 
 
|SR0| 
 
 
ABVOL0 
 
***0.19 
(0.78%) 
 
***0.92 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.27 
(0.85%) 
 
*-0.17 
(8.69%) 
 
**-0.28 
(2.37%) 
 
-0.07 
(25.55%) 
 
0.05 
(34.65%) 
***0.18 
(0.86%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.28 
(0.80%) 
 
*-0.18 
(8.22%) 
 
**-0.29 
(2.41%) 
 
-0.08 
(23.09%) 
 
0.06 
(33.81%) 
***0.21 
(0.60%) 
 
***0.90 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.26 
(0.94%) 
 
*-0.16 
(8.86%) 
 
**-0.27 
(2.69%) 
 
-0.06 
(30.64%) 
 
0.04 
(38.09%) 
***0.20 
(0.71%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.28 
(0.86%) 
 
*-0.19 
(8.01%) 
 
**-0.29 
(2.23%) 
 
-0.04 
(39.91%) 
 
0.05 
(37.30%) 
***0.18 
(0.86%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.26 
(0.89%) 
 
*-0.19 
(8.11%) 
 
**-0.27 
(2.24%) 
 
-0.06 
(28.64%) 
 
0.06 
(30.34%) 
***0.17 
(0.92%) 
 
***0.95 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.27 
(0.75%) 
 
*-0.22 
(7.64%) 
 
**-0.28 
(2.07%) 
 
-0.07 
(25.39%) 
 
0.05 
(35.21%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient estimates, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% 
(3,298 events) 
|SR0i|>10% 
(2,323 events) 
|SR0i|>3σi 
(3,572 events)
|SR0i|>4σi 
(2,307 events)
|AR0i|>8% 
(3,072 events) 
|AR0i|>10% 
(1,989 events) 
Intercept 
 
 
VIX_dum 
 
 
***-0.52 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.21 
(0.00%) 
 
***-0.54 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.23 
(0.00%) 
 
***-0.50 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.19 
(0.00%) 
 
***-0.51 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.20 
(0.00%) 
 
***-0.55 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.23 
(0.00%) 
 
***-0.56 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.26 
(0.00%) 
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MCap 
 
 
beta 
 
 
SR_Volat 
 
 
|SR0| 
 
 
ABVOL0 
 
***-0.45 
(0.10%) 
 
*0.20 
(6.03%) 
 
**0.23 
(3.76%) 
 
0.04 
(39.67%) 
 
-0.06 
(28.67%) 
***-0.46 
(0.11%) 
 
*0.21 
(6.10%) 
 
**0.24 
(3.65%) 
 
0.05 
(37.25%) 
 
-0.05 
(32.08%) 
***-0.44 
(0.12%) 
 
*0.22 
(5.67%) 
 
**0.22 
(3.99%) 
 
0.03 
(46.37%) 
 
-0.07 
(25.91%) 
***-0.45 
(0.11%) 
 
*0.21 
(6.31%) 
 
**0.24 
(3.28%) 
 
0.04 
(42.82%) 
 
-0.08 
(26.91%) 
***-0.47 
(0.06%) 
 
*0.21 
(5.87%) 
 
**0.22 
(3.92%) 
 
0.05 
(33.09%) 
 
-0.05 
(34.84%) 
***-0.48 
(0.05%) 
 
*0.20 
(6.44%) 
 
**0.23 
(3.87%) 
 
0.04 
(39.77%) 
 
-0.06 
(31.11%)  
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
5.5 Robustness Tests 
I apply two additional sample filtering criteria:  
First, I adjust my working sample so that it would not contain overlapping price moves. That is, if there 
were two large price changes within a 20-trading days window, I exclude both of them form my sample. 
Tables 8A, 8B and 8C exhibit average ARs and AR differences between the two VIX conditions, for 
the filtered sample of large price moves, according to event definition proxies A, B and C, respectively. 
The Tables show that after excluding the overlapping price moves from the sample, both price reversals 
following large price moves taking place on the days when the value of VIX changes in the direction 
which is opposite to that of the move, and AR differences between the two mood-related conditions 
remain significant for both large price increases and decreases and for all the post-event windows, 
representing an additional support for the existence of the effect of mood on post-event stock returns.  
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Table 8A. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy A for Defining Large Price Moves, Overlapping Price Moves Excluded 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,215 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,324 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(652 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(721 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.16 
(26.23%) 
 
0.01 
(88.65%) 
 
0.25 
(23.04%) 
 
0.29 
(23.50%) 
**-0.39 
(1.95%) 
 
*-0.19 
(8.46%) 
 
***-0.68 
(0.68%) 
 
***-0.74 
(0.19%) 
***0.55 
(0.15%) 
 
*0.20 
(5.98%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.08%) 
 
***1.03 
(0.01%) 
0.17 
(29.67%) 
 
0.03 
(52.36%) 
 
0.27 
(22.13%) 
 
0.30 
(19.11%) 
**-0.41 
(1.67%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.81%) 
 
***-0.70 
(0.56%) 
 
***-0.75 
(0.18%) 
***0.58 
(0.10%) 
 
*0.20 
(6.74%) 
 
***0.97 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.05 
(0.00%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,423 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,531 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(968 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,044 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
**0.59 
(1.47%) 
 
*0.21 
(9.21%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.13 
(0.02%) 
-0.25 
(18.84%) 
 
-0.08 
(38.42%) 
 
-0.21 
(28.62%) 
 
-0.43 
(17.98%) 
***0.84 
(0.11%) 
 
*0.29 
(5.78%) 
 
***1.12 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.56 
(0.00%) 
**0.60 
(1.41%) 
 
*0.24 
(8.35%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.15 
(0.00%) 
-0.25 
(19.86%) 
 
-0.08 
(40.21%) 
 
-0.22 
(30.69%) 
 
-0.44 
(16.38%) 
***0.85 
(0.12%) 
 
*0.32 
(5.23%) 
 
***1.15 
(0.01%) 
 
***1.59 
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 8B. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy B for Defining Large Price Moves, Overlapping Price Moves Excluded 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(1,325 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,416 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(703 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(764 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.15 
(28.86%) 
 
0.03 
(49.67%) 
 
0.25 
(22.39%) 
 
0.29 
(19.64%) 
**-0.39 
(1.86%) 
 
*-0.18 
(9.02%) 
 
***-0.66 
(0.87%) 
 
***-0.71 
(0.25%) 
***0.54 
(0.17%) 
 
*0.21 
(6.00%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.14%) 
 
***1.00 
(0.01%) 
0.16 
(30.92%) 
 
0.02 
(65.87%) 
 
0.26 
(24.31%) 
 
0.29 
(20.05%) 
**-0.41 
(1.57%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.56%) 
 
***-0.69 
(0.52%) 
 
***-0.73 
(0.20%) 
***0.57 
(0.11%) 
 
*0.19 
(6.94%) 
 
***0.95 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.02 
(0.00%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(1,584 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,652 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(1,015 events)
∆VIX<0 
(1,076 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
**0.60 
(1.31%) 
 
*0.21 
(9.25%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.01%) 
 
***1.16 
(0.00%) 
-0.25 
(19.57%) 
 
-0.09 
(37.36%) 
 
-0.23 
(26.72%) 
 
-0.45 
(15.37%) 
***0.85 
(0.07%) 
 
*0.30 
(5.13%) 
 
***1.16 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.61 
(0.00%) 
**0.61 
(1.35%) 
 
*0.25 
(7.88%) 
 
***0.94 
(0.01%) 
 
***1.18 
(0.00%) 
-0.26 
(19.21%) 
 
-0.08 
(45.43%) 
 
-0.24 
(27.62%) 
 
-0.46 
(14.55%) 
***0.87 
(0.06%) 
 
*0.33 
(5.01%) 
 
***1.18 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.64  
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijafs        International Journal of Accounting and Finance Studies           Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018 
123 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Table 8C. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy C for Defining Large Price Moves, Overlapping Price Moves Excluded 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,085 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,134 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(578 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(606 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.17 
(25.64%) 
 
0.05 
(40.50%) 
 
0.28 
(20.71%) 
 
0.32 
(16.97%) 
**-0.42 
(1.08%) 
 
*-0.18 
(9.37%) 
 
***-0.68 
(0.74%) 
 
***-0.73 
(0.21%) 
***0.59 
(0.09%) 
 
*0.23 
(5.14%) 
 
***0.96 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.05 
(0.00%) 
0.19 
(26.54%) 
 
0.04 
(49.66%) 
 
0.29 
(18.62%) 
 
0.33 
(19.52%) 
**-0.44 
(1.07%) 
 
*-0.19 
(9.03%) 
 
***-0.70 
(0.48%) 
 
***-0.75 
(0.14%) 
***0.63 
(0.05%) 
 
*0.23 
(5.42%) 
 
***0.99 
(0.01%) 
 
***1.08 
(0.00%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,386 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,427 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(902 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(988 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
**0.61 
(1.21%) 
 
*0.21 
(9.33%) 
 
***0.93 
(0.02%) 
 
***1.17 
(0.00%) 
-0.27 
(16.57%) 
 
-0.09 
(35.76%) 
 
-0.24 
(21.37%) 
 
-0.46 
(14.31%) 
***0.88 
(0.04%) 
 
*0.30 
(5.24%) 
 
***1.17 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.63 
(0.00%) 
**0.62 
(1.31%) 
 
*0.26 
(7.51%) 
 
***0.96 
(0.02%) 
 
***1.18 
(0.00%) 
-0.27 
(17.88%) 
 
-0.10 
(38.64%) 
 
-0.26 
(24.61%) 
 
-0.48 
(11.12%) 
***0.89 
(0.04%) 
 
**0.36 
(3.58%) 
 
***1.22 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.66  
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Finally, following the methodology employed in several previous studies dealing with large stock price 
moves (e.g., Cox & Peterson, 1994; Park, 1995), I exclude from my working sample the stocks whose 
prices prior to large price changes were lower than ten dollars, and present the respective average 
post-event ARs and AR differences, according to the three event definition proxies in Tables 9A, 9B 
and 9C. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the total sample, demonstrating that 
the documented effect of mood on post-event stock returns is not driven by any exceptional “cheap” 
stocks’ price behavior. 
 
Table 9A. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy A for Defining Large Price Moves, Stocks Below $10 Excluded 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,147 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,261 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(605 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(684 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.12 
(34.56%) 
 
0.01 
(90.21%) 
 
0.20 
(29.63%) 
 
0.22 
(27.85%) 
**-0.35 
(3.12%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.13%) 
 
***-0.64 
(0.89%) 
 
***-0.69 
(0.25%) 
***0.47 
(0.76%) 
 
*0.18 
(7.23%) 
 
***0.84 
(0.22%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.07%) 
0.13 
(33.69%) 
 
0.02 
(58.63%) 
 
0.22 
(28.41%) 
 
0.25 
(26.07%) 
**-0.37 
(2.36%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.67%) 
 
***-0.66 
(0.85%) 
 
***-0.71 
(0.35%) 
***0.50 
(0.35%) 
 
*0.19 
(6.97%) 
 
***0.88 
(0.15%) 
 
***0.96 
(0.02%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>8% |SR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,376 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,462 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(886 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(962 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
**0.55 
(1.96%) 
 
*0.19 
(9.82%) 
-0.22 
(24.07%) 
 
-0.07 
(40.15%) 
***0.77 
(0.19%) 
 
*0.26 
(6.58%) 
**0.57 
(1.86%) 
 
*0.21 
(9.25%) 
-0.22 
(25.94%) 
 
-0.08 
(42.38%) 
***0.79 
(0.20%) 
 
*0.29 
(6.87%) 
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1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
 
***0.85 
(0.10%) 
 
***1.06 
(0.05%) 
 
-0.17 
(31.74%) 
 
-0.38 
(22.55%) 
 
***1.02 
(0.07%) 
 
***1.44 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.88 
(0.05%) 
 
***1.09 
(0.01%) 
 
-0.19 
(36.52%) 
 
-0.40 
(21.37%) 
 
***1.07 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.49 
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 9B. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy B for Defining Large Price Moves, Stocks Below $10 Excluded 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(1,238 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,327 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(645 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(700 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.11 
(37.45%) 
 
0.02 
(54.69%) 
 
0.19 
(29.68%) 
 
0.23 
(27.28%) 
**-0.33 
(2.87%) 
 
*-0.15 
(9.68%) 
 
***-0.63 
(0.92%) 
 
***-0.68 
(0.32%) 
***0.44 
(0.75%) 
 
*0.17 
(7.95%) 
 
***0.82 
(0.21%) 
 
***0.91 
(0.03%) 
0.12 
(38.14%) 
 
0.02 
(66.37%) 
 
0.21 
(30.28%) 
 
0.24 
(25.63%) 
**-0.34 
(2.52%) 
 
*-0.16 
(9.74%) 
 
***-0.64 
(0.83%) 
 
***-0.70 
(0.27%) 
***0.46 
(0.54%) 
 
*0.18 
(7.36%) 
 
***0.85 
(0.17%) 
 
***0.94 
(0.01%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|SR0i|>3σi |SR0i|>4σi 
∆VIX>0 
(1,458 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,561 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(946 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(989 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
**0.54 
(1.87%) 
 
*0.18 
(9.68%) 
-0.21 
(23.67%) 
 
-0.07 
(43.15%) 
***0.75 
(0.14%) 
 
*0.25 
(7.56%) 
**0.56 
(1.48%) 
 
*0.19 
(9.14%) 
-0.22 
(22.13%) 
 
-0.08 
(47.39%) 
***0.78 
(0.10%) 
 
*0.27 
(7.23%) 
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1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
 
***0.83 
(0.06%) 
 
***1.04 
(0.00%) 
 
-0.16 
(30.74%) 
 
-0.37 
(19.53%) 
 
***0.99 
(0.02%) 
 
***1.41 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.85 
(0.04%) 
 
***1.07 
(0.00%) 
 
-0.18 
(31.45%) 
 
-0.40 
(18.70%) 
 
***1.03 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.47  
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 9C. Abnormal Stock Returns Following Large Stock Price Increases and Decreases, by the 
Sign of ∆VIX: Proxy C for Defining Large Price Moves, Stocks Below $10 Excluded 
Panel A: Large stock price increases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,006 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,064 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(512 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(574 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
0.13 
(31.62%) 
 
0.03 
(47.80%) 
 
0.22 
(24.18%) 
 
0.26 
(21.25%) 
**-0.36 
(1.85%) 
 
*-0.16 
(9.56%) 
 
***-0.66 
(0.90%) 
 
***-0.71 
(0.28%) 
***0.49 
(0.21%) 
 
*0.19 
(6.34%) 
 
***0.88 
(0.09%) 
 
***0.97 
(0.01%) 
0.14 
(29.81%) 
 
0.04 
(50.02%) 
 
0.23 
(23.63%) 
 
0.28 
(20.72%) 
**-0.38 
(1.68%) 
 
*-0.17 
(9.24%) 
 
***-0.67 
(0.76%) 
 
***-0.73 
(0.18%) 
***0.52 
(0.15%) 
 
*0.21 
(5.99%) 
 
***0.90 
(0.06%) 
 
***1.01 
(0.00%) 
Panel B: Large stock price decreases 
 
Days relative 
to event 
Average AR following initial price changes, % (2-tailed p-values) 
|AR0i|>8% |AR0i|>10% 
∆VIX>0 
(1,293 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(1,351 events)
Difference ∆VIX>0 
(867 events) 
∆VIX<0 
(907 events) 
Difference 
1 
 
 
2 
 
**0.57 
(1.69%) 
 
*0.19 
(9.74%) 
-0.23 
(19.68%) 
 
-0.08 
(39.04%) 
***0.80 
(0.06%) 
 
*0.27 
(5.87%) 
**0.58 
(1.53%) 
 
*0.20 
(8.66%) 
-0.24 
(19.06%) 
 
-0.09 
(40.86%) 
***0.82 
(0.07%) 
 
*0.29 
(5.32%) 
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1 to 5 
 
 
1 to 20 
 
 
***0.87 
(0.05%) 
 
***1.08 
(0.00%) 
 
-0.19 
(24.19%) 
 
-0.40 
(16.85%) 
 
***1.06 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.48 
(0.00%) 
 
***0.89 
(0.03%) 
 
***1.11 
(0.00%) 
 
-0.21 
(25.77%) 
 
-0.42 
(15.44%) 
 
***1.10 
(0.00%) 
 
***1.53  
(0.00%) 
Asterisks denote 2-tailed p-values: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I analyzed the effect of investors’ future volatility expectations, expressed by VIX index, 
on large daily stock price changes. Assuming that the direction of changes in the value of VIX is 
negatively correlated with investors’ mood, I suggested that if the former is opposite to the direction of 
a contemporaneously occurring company-specific shock, then investors may consider the shock to have 
a greater subjective probability of leading to stock returns of the respective sign, which increases the 
magnitude of the shock, creating an overreaction. Therefore, since stock price overreaction to news is 
recognized to result in subsequent price reversals, I hypothesized that stock price reversals following 
large daily price changes may be more pronounced if the direction of the initial price change is 
opposite to the sign of change in the value of VIX on the day when the price change takes place.  
The results of the empirical analysis supported my research hypothesis. Analyzing a large sample of 
major daily stock price moves and defining the latter according to a number of alternative proxies, 
based on both raw and abnormal stock returns, and on both absolute and relative (scaled by the 
respective stock’s volatility) return thresholds, I documented that both positive and negative stock price 
moves accompanied by the opposite-sign contemporaneous daily changes in VIX are followed by 
significant reversals on the next two trading days and over five- and twenty-day intervals following the 
event, the magnitude of the reversals increasing over longer post-event windows, while large stock 
price changes taking place on the days when the value of VIX changes in the same direction are 
followed by non-significant price drifts.  
Furthermore, I established that the effect of volatility expectations, or presumably the effect of mood, 
on post-event stock returns was of higher magnitude for low capitalization firms and stocks with higher 
volatility of historical returns, suggesting that large price moves of low market capitalization and more 
volatile stocks are more affected (or even, driven) by investors’ mood, possibly due to the reduced 
amount of information on these stocks and their higher risk levels. Moreover, this effect remained 
significant after accounting for additional company-specific (size, beta, historical volatility) and 
event-specific (stock’s return and trading volume on the event day) factors. The results were robust to 
different return thresholds, both higher and lower, to different methods of adjusting returns, such as 
market-adjusted returns, market-model excess returns, and Fama-French three-factor model excess 
returns, and to different sample filtering criteria.  
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This study’s findings may be valuable for both financial theoreticians in their eternal discussion about 
stock market efficiency, and practitioners in search of potentially profitable investment strategies. 
Potential directions for further research may include expanding the analysis to other stock exchanges, 
classifying the sample of large stock price changes by short- and medium-term pre-event return 
statistics, and analyzing longer post-event windows.  
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Notes 
Note 1. For all the three proxies for defining the large stock price moves, I employ a number of 
additional thresholds. The results for all of these thresholds (available upon request from the author) are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Section 5. 
Note 2. Alternatively, I calculate ARs using Market Adjusted Returns (MAR)—return differences from 
the market index, and the Fama-French three-factor plus momentum model. The results (available upon 
request from the author) remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Section 5. 
Note 3. The Market-Model beta is estimated for each stock over 250 trading days preceding the large 
price change. 
Note 4. The results for medium capitalization stocks for both large price increases and decreases, for all 
the post-event windows and according to all the proxies and thresholds, indicate that these stocks are 
less influenced by the effect of mood than low capitalization stocks, and more influenced by the effect 
of mood than high capitalization stocks. The detailed results are available upon request from the author. 
Overall, the results demonstrate that the Day-0 effect of mood on stock ARs following large price 
moves decreases with market capitalization. 
Note 5. The results for medium volatility stocks for both large price increases and decreases, for all the 
post-event windows and according to all the proxies and thresholds, indicate that these stocks are less 
influenced by the effect of mood than high volatility stocks, and more influenced by the effect of mood 
than low volatility stocks. The detailed results are available upon request from the author. Overall, the 
results demonstrate that the Day-0 effect of mood on stock ARs following large price moves increases 
with historical stock volatility.  
Note 6. I have also performed the analysis of post-event ARs for three subsamples partitioned by the 
CAPM stock beta calculated over Days -250 to -1. In line with Baker and Wurgler (2006), I have 
documented that the Day-0 effect of mood on stock ARs following large price moves increases with 
stock beta. The detailed results are available upon request from the author. 
 
 
